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Abstract
Die ser Bei trag wid met  sich den je ni gen Ele men -
ten,  die  dazu die nen, poli ti sche Par tei en ange -
sichts  von  durch auto ri tä re  Regime gesteu er ten
Unter drü ckungs maß nah men  zu ver ei nen.  Er
unter sucht  die Fak to ren,  die  zur Koo pe ra ti on
pro  - demo kra ti scher Kräf te bei tra gen  oder die -
se behin dern.  Dazu die nen  die ver glei chen de
Ana ly se  sowie  die Gegen über stel lung erfolg rei -
cher  wie erfolg lo ser Ansät ze,  die  eine sol che
Koa li ti on  im  post  - kom mu nis ti schen Ser bi en
her vor brach ten.  Die Auto rin  sieht  dabei  die
Wech sel wir kung  von sie ben Haupt fak to ren  als
beson ders wich tig  an :  einen geschärften  Sinn
von der Not wen dig keit  des Wan dels;  die Wahr -
neh mung eines kri ti schen  Moments; öffent li che
Unter stüt zung  für  die Ein heit ( der Oppo si ti on );
Druck  und Unter stüt zung  durch  die Zivil ge sell -
schaft; Unter stüt zung  durch  die inter na tio na le
Gemein schaft;  eine kla re, inter ne Hie rar chie
sowie  die Erfah run gen  der Ver gan gen heit. 
That the consolidation of democracy in the post - communist world1 occurred nei-
ther “quickly” nor “smoothly” is widely recognized.2 This consensus is due, at
least in part, to the tumultuous set of transitions that followed the revolutions of
1989. With Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union giving way to ethnic conflict
and political stagnation, the onset of liberal democracy in Central and Eastern
Europe was taken to symbolize the crest of the third wave.3 By the mid - 1990s
attention had moved from democratic breakthrough to democratic setback.
Scholars warned of a “hollowing out” of democracy accompanied by the emer-
gence of hybrid regimes that were neither wholly democratic nor fully authoritar-
ian.4 To many, the prospect of further democratic transformation appeared
bleak : liberal democracy was on the wane.5 Thus it was all the more surprising
when in the late 1990s a series of electoral revolutions ignited a democratic
revival in Europe’s eastern and southeastern quarters. Analyses of such revolu-
tions suggest that where pro - democratic political parties succeed in forming
united coalitions in opposition to hybrid regimes, such revolutions are often met
with success. Yet the factors that enable coalition formation remain undefined.
This paper seeks to identify the elements that serve to unite political parties in
the face of regime - sponsored oppression. Which efforts contribute to coalition
building ? What conditions must be met before parties are willing to unite ?
Tentative answers to these questions are offered on the basis of an in - depth com-
parative analysis contrasting successful and unsuccessful attempts to form a
united pro - democratic coalition in post - communist Serbia. In so doing, this
paper aims to generate a series of propositions regarding the factors and actors
enabling coalition formation in competitive authoritarian contexts.
I. Coalition formation
Coalition formation is widely believed to have been an essential element – if not
always equally so – in each of the electoral revolutions that emerged in the late
1990s and early 2000s. In a comparative case study of electoral revolutions in
Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, Michael McFaul found that “a viable alternative
to the incumbent leader seemed critical” and thus a united opposition may be
“crucial” for such revolutions to succeed.6 Such findings were supported by a
2006 study conducted by Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik. In their analysis of
the Slovakian, Serbian and Georgian revolutions, they identified a unified politi-
cal opposition as one of a handful of core components of the electoral revolu-
tionary model.7 Perhaps the most thorough analysis of such breakthroughs was
offered by Marc Morje Howard and Philip Roessler. In conclusions drawn from
a cross - national statistical analysis of fifty competitive authoritarian regimes, the
authors found the formation of a coalition of pro - democratic forces in the run -
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up to national elections to be the single most significant factor enabling demo-
cratic breakthrough.8
In light of the importance attributed to pro - democratic coalitions in competi-
tive authoritarian contexts, one would expect the means and methods through
which such coalitions are established to be well elucidated. This is not the case
however. This paper therefore examines the elements that enable pro - demo-
cratic political parties to form unified coalitions in competitive authoritarian
contexts. The following section gives an overview of coalition formation. 
In most cases of electoral revolution – in Serbia and elsewhere – coalition for-
mation was not without precedent. To the contrary, in many instances the oppo-
sition embarked upon a series of failed efforts to form a coalition long before
regime change was achieved. Such efforts often excluded key segments of the
opposition or were prone to interparty bickering. In Ukraine, for example,
attempts to form a coalition were regarded as only “halfhearted”.9 In Slovakia,
oppositional parties “underwent much - needed transformation” before coming
“to the realization that in order to confront the authoritarian tendencies of the
incumbent government they would have to overcome their differences.”10 This
was also the case in Serbia, where despite repeated attempts to form a viable
coalition, the pro - democratic opposition was widely regarded as fractured and
incompetent.11 Such alliances cannot be regarded as a credible challenge to
authoritarian incumbents : They were thus unsuccessful attempts to form a uni-
fied coalition. By contrast, a successful attempt to form such a coalition in a com-
petitive authoritarian context succeeds in uniting the vast majority of pro - demo-
cratic political parties – including the most significant oppositional parties –
behind a clearly delineated goal. In the case of facilitating regime change, the
overarching goal of such a coalition would likely be that of electorally defeating
an authoritarian regime. Parties’ support for this goal must be unequivocal;
there can be little doubt in the minds of the public as to the coalition’s chief
objective. Moreover, parties’ disaffection for the regime must exceed their ani-
mosity towards their fellow coalition members – they cannot profess a united
front in their antipathy to the ruling regime and simultaneously berate their col-
leagues. By comparing successful and unsuccessful attempts to form such coali-
tions, it may be possible to identify the factors that contribute to coalition forma-
tion in competitive authoritarian contexts. 
Spoerri-Joksić, Uniting the opposition 69
8 Marc Morje Howard / Philip G. Roessler, Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competi -
tive Authoritarian Regimes. In : American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2006) 2,
p. 365–381, here 375.
9 Taras Kuzio, The Opposition’s Road to Success. In : Journal of Democracy, 16 (2005)
2, p. 117–130, here 122.
10 Joerg Forbrig / Pavol Demeš, Reclaiming Democracy : Civil Society and Electoral
Change in Central and Eastern Europe, German Marshall Fund of the United States /
Washington D.C. 2007, p. 27.
11 See for example : Serbia’s Inadequate Opposition. In : Jane’s Intelligence Review, 27
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This article embarks upon this effort by using post - communist Serbia as a
case study. As shall be shown, in the first decade of its post - communist transition
Serbia exemplified the competitive authoritarian regime - type. As did democrats
in Slovakia, Croatia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, the Serbian opposition
exploited national elections to achieve regime change. And as in each of these
cases, Serbia’s democratic forces united in the run - up to revolution. Not only did
a united opposition prove essential for achieving electoral victory, but it pro-
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Coalition* Formed Duration Members**
AOS June 1990 6 months DS, SPO, NRP, DF, LP, SSSP
USDO May 1991 3 months SPO, SLS, ND-MS, DF
DEPOS May 1992 1.5 years SPO, SLS, ND-MS, SSS, DSS
DEKO Nov. 1992 Few days SPO, SLS, ND-MS, SSS, DSS,DS, GSS, SD
DEPOS II Nov. 1993 3 months SPO, ND, GSS
DA Dec. 1995 4 months DS, DSS, SLS, SNS
Zajedno Nov. 1996 5 months SPO, DS, GSS, DSS
AfC July 1998 1.5 years DS, GSS, DHSS
DOS Jan. 2000 3 years***
ASNS, DA, DC, DS, DSS, GSS,
DHSS, LŠ, LSV, ND, NS, PDS,
RDSV, SD, SDU, SVM, VK, SDP
* Associated Opposition of Serbia ( AOS ), United Serbian Democratic Opposition ( USDO ),
Democratic Movement of Serbia ( DEPOS ), Democratic Coalition ( DEKO ), Democratic
Alliance ( DA ), Alliance for Change ( AfC ), Democratic Opposition of Serbia ( DOS ). 
** Democratic Party ( DS ), Serbian Renewal Movement ( SPO ), National Radical Party
(NRP), Democratic Forum ( DF ), Liberal Party ( LP ), Serbian St. Sava Party ( SSSP ), New
Democracy – Movement for Serbia ( ND - MS ), Democratic Party of Serbia ( DSS ), Serbian
Peasant’s Party ( SSS ), Civic Alliance of Serbia ( GSS ), Social Democracy ( SDP ), New
Democracy ( ND ), Democratic Christian Party ( DHSS ), Demo cratic Center ( DC ), Demo -
cratic Alternative ( DA ), Social Democratic Union ( SDU ), League of Social Democrats of
Vojvodina ( LSDV ), Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina (RSDV), Alliance of Hun -
garians from Vojvodina ( SVM ), Vojvodina Coalition ( KV ), Social Democracy ( SD ), Move -
ment of Democratic Serbia ( PDS ), Sandjak Democratic Party (SDP), League for Šumadija
(LŠ ), Reformists of Vojvodina ( RV ), Serbian Con gres sional Party ( SNS ), Association of
Independent Labor Unions of Serbia (ASNS).
*** The DSS left the DOS coalition in late 2001, after which coalition went by the name
“DOS Minus”.
Figure 1 : Coalitions attempted in Serbia, 1990–2000
vided the means through which to mobilize the masses when and where an
incumbent refused to recognize its defeat. This was the case in Serbia, just as it
was in each of the colored revolutions.12 The Serbian case is instructive in so far
as Milošević’s opponents repeatedly attempted – and repeatedly failed – to form
a unified coalition. Indeed, over a ten year period the leaders of Serbia’s pro -
democratic political parties attempted to take a united front against Milošević a
total of nine times ( see Figure 1). Many of the challenges inhibiting coalition for-
mation in Serbia are symptomatic of competitive authoritarian rule and are
therefore not isolated to the Serbian case. By comparing successful and unsuc-
cessful attempts to form a unified coalition, it may be possible to differentiate the
factors enabling coalition formation in Serbia and thereby shed light on the
causes of coalition formation elsewhere. 
II. Competitive authoritarianism and electoral revolution
The regimes which emerged after the collapse of communism were exceedingly
diverse. On the one hand, countries including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic followed a transitological course, moving swiftly from liberalization to
democratization and finally, consolidation.13 Other states, such as Bulgaria, devi-
ated from this linear path, approaching liberal democracy after a number of false
starts. In many post - Soviet states, by contrast, the roots of authoritarianism grew
further entrenched. Yet of all the regime types to develop after communism’s
demise, it was the rise of the competitive authoritarian regime which deviated
furthest from scholars’ expectations.
The term competitive authoritarianism refers to a variant of the hybrid re -
gime- type.14 Like democracies, elections in competitive authoritarian regimes
serve as the primary vehicle through which to obtain and employ political
authority. Unlike genuine democracies, however, the rules of democratic prac-
tice are obstructed so thoroughly that the regime cannot be considered demo-
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cratic. While careful to maintain a semblance of competition, such regimes often
seek to shift the balance of power away from their opponents. Hence, while they
respect a nominal degree of political pluralism embodied in multiparty elections
and alternative sources of information, they monopolize national media outlets,
compromise election results, violate citizens’ political and civil liberties, and tor-
ment the pro - democratic opposition. By the mid - 1990s, eleven cases of competi-
tive authoritarianism had arisen throughout post - communist Europe and the for-
mer Soviet Union.15
Paradoxically, it is in the strength of the competitive authoritarian regime that
its greatest weakness lies. Indeed, its unique admixture of pluralism and oppres-
sion is susceptible to electoral revolution. Towards the end of the 20th century a
handful of seemingly entrenched competitive authoritarian regimes – Mečiar’s
Slovakia, Tuđman’s Croatia, Milošević’s Serbia, Shevardnadze’s Georgia, Kuch -
ma’s Ukraine, and Akayev’s Kyrgyzstan – were ousted through democratic
means. In each of these cases, opponents of the regime exploited democratic
openings in one or more of four arenas, including the electoral, legislative, judi-
cial, and media, to bring about regime change.16 The electoral arena has proven
to be the most significant of these because it provides a vehicle through which
oppositional parties may unseat an incumbent. Where elections facilitate a trans-
fer of power from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, we speak of electoral
revolution. Because competitive authoritarian regimes may differ in regards to
the extremity of their oppression – Mečiar’s Slovakia being less oppressive than
Milošević’s Serbia, for example – electoral revolutions do not always take the
same form. In some cases, authoritarian regimes will accept electoral defeat and
promptly relinquish power to democratic rivals. In others, the regime may refuse
to recognize such defeat, thereby sparking a massive popular protest the scope
of which ultimately compels the regime to stand down.17 Since 1996, eight elec-
toral revolutions have taken place in post - communist Europe and the former
Soviet Union, the latter of which are colloquially referred to as colored revolu-
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tions.18 This article examines just one of the factors which contributed to elec-
toral revolution in Serbia : That of coalition formation. To better understand the
causes of coalition formation in Serbia, unsuccessful efforts to form a coalition
are juxtaposed against successful attempts in the hopes that determinants of the
latter may be isolated. The following pages thus present a comparative analysis
of eight failed attempts to form a unified pro - democratic coalition in Serbia and
one ultimately successful attempt to form such a coalition. Before doing so how-
ever, the nature of Milošević’s rule is briefly examined in the section below. 
III. Milošević’s Serbia
By the time of Slobodan Milošević’s rise to prominence in the late 1980s,
Yugoslavia was regarded as the communist world’s most liberal state. Boasting a
comparatively strong economy, open borders and the freest media in the com-
munist world,19 few predicted the hardship that would accompany Yugoslavia’s
transition to pluralist politics. Yugoslavia’s first multiparty elections were staged
in 1990 and saw a series of nationalist parties come to power. Rather than ease
the transition to liberal democracy, many sought to consolidate their victories. As
would leaders throughout the former Soviet Union, political elites set out to rid
their electorates of credible political competition. Thus began Yugoslavia’s jour-
ney into the gray zone.20
In Serbia, the largest of Yugoslavia’s six republics, the road to competitive
authoritarianism was paved by Milošević’s Socialist Party of Serbia ( SPS ). In the
republic’s first multiparty elections held in December 1990, the SPS was victori-
ous, winning 46 percent of the popular vote.21 Much of the SPS’s success owed
to advantages it accrued as the successor of the League of Communists of
Serbia. The monopoly on state institutions and national infrastructure belonging
to the communist party was placed in SPS hands. Milošević and his allies did not
hesitate to exploit this advantage to the fullest. As did Mečiar, Tuđman, Kuchma
and other democratic imposters, Milošević began by reigning in fledgling
sources of alternative information. Independent media faced a series of hur -
dles – financial, physical, and otherwise – designed to ensure their political irrele-
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vance. The remaining ‘free’ media was placed in the hands of the regime with
political coverage skewed accordingly.22
With its hold on the media secure, Milošević proceeded to tighten his grip on
Serbia’s political institutions. As would Akayev in Kyrgyzstan, Aliev in Azer bai -
jan, Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, and most recently, Putin in Russia, Milošević
modified electoral system laws to further augment his power base. Over the
course of Milošević’s rule, Serbia boasted three different electoral systems, none
of which respected total parity.23 This was not without reason. As Pippa Norris
notes, the choice of electoral system is “designed to bring about certain objec-
tives.”24 In the run - up to Serbia’s first parliamentary elections, the republic’s
one - party parliament adopted a majoritarian system known to harshly penalize
smaller parties. Because such systems exaggerate the share of seats in the largest
party’s favor, the SPS’s 46.1 percent of the popular vote translated to 77.6 per-
cent of seats in parliament, thereby creating what Milan Jovanović aptly entitles
a ‘manufactured majority’ ( see Figure 2).25
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Election % of Vote % of Mandates
December 1990 46.1 77.6
December 1992 28.8 40.4
December 1993 36.7 49.2
September 199726 34.2 44.0
Figure 2 : SPS results in Serbian parliamentary elections
Power in parliament soon translated into the coercion of the judicial and execu-
tive branches, as Serbia’s parliament has the power to appoint and dismiss
republican judges, as well as to form the ruling government. Where electoral
manipulation failed to bring about the desired result, Milošević would resort to
electoral fraud, the severity of which increased as Milošević’s popularity
waned.27 In 1997, for example, the regime refused to recognize the opposition’s
municipal victories during local elections despite preliminary results reflecting
an oppositional victory.28 In 2000, the regime ignored Vojislav Koštunica’s
Presidential victory in the face of exit polls demonstrating Milošević’s defeat. 
Given the extremes to which Milošević went to preserve his authority, the
vibrancy of the opposition was remarkable. Anti - regime protests were a regular
occurrence, often uniting tens of thousands in opposition to the regime’s heavy
handed practices. Heeding the calls of the electorate, Serbia’s oppositional par-
ties repeatedly challenged the Milošević regime. Yet it was only in late 2000 that
such efforts reached fruition. This is due not merely to Milošević’s iron fist, but
also to the failure of the political opposition itself. Indeed, if the unity of Serbia’s
democratic forces was the source of Milošević’s demise, then its discord was the
source of his decade - long rule.29 The following section examines the opposi-
tion’s failure to form a united coalition against Milošević’s rule. 
IV. Attempted coalition formation in Serbia
The history of Serbia’s post - communist opposition begins in the summer of
1990. Serbia’s fledgling oppositional parties sought to show a united front in
their demands for an early start to pluralist politics. This six - party coalition, the
Associated Opposition of Serbia ( AOS ), called for multiparty elections, a new
democratic constitution, an extended campaign period, and a host of other guar-
antees designed to level the political playing field.30 Shortly after the first of
these demands was met, the AOS collapsed amidst a series of power struggles,
policy disagreements, and personality clashes. 
The next attempt to form an alliance occurred in May 1992, when the Serbian
Renewal Movement ( SPO ) and two smaller political parties formed the United
Serbian Democratic Opposition ( USDO ).31 The alliance proved untenable how-
ever, as Serbia’s second largest pro - democratic oppositional party – the Demo -
cratic Party ( DS ) – refused to participate. In May 1993 Serbia’s opposition again
attempted a united front. On this occasion, five parties, including the SPO and
the Democratic Party of Serbia ( DSS ) formed the Democratic Movement of
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Serbia ( DEPOS ).32 Like its predecessor, DEPOS suffered from DS’s absence.
Moreover, friction was apparent between party leaders. While DEPOS com-
peted jointly in parliamentary elections, public attacks amongst DEPOS mem-
bers, as well as regular bickering between DEPOS and the DS, hardly resembled
a united pro - democratic front. When in November presidential candidate Milan
Panić invited all oppositional parties to form a single alliance against Milošević –
the Democratic Coalition ( DEKO ) – the response was a resounding ‘no’. 
A revised DEPOS II was formed in December 1993, composed of the SPO,
New Democracy ( ND ), and the Civic Alliance of Serbia ( GSS ). Again, despite
repeated efforts on the part of Milan Panić, both the DS and DSS refused to par-
take in the coalition, opting instead to compete independently in Serbia’s parlia-
mentary elections. DEPOS II unraveled in the aftermath of these elections after
ND and six DEPOS politicians joined a coalition government with Milošević’s
SPS. 
In December 1995, the Democratic Alliance ( DA ) was formed, consisting of
four parties including the DS.33 The alliance’s members shared little unity of pur-
pose, however. Not only did they lack a joint policy, but they had no clear elec-
toral strategy in mind. The Alliance finally collapsed when the DS took its exit to
form Zajedno with the SPO, GSS, and DSS. Unity proved short - lived, however.
With a handful of local, albeit symbolic, victories behind them, Zajedno col-
lapsed just months before Serbian parliamentary elections were held. 
In July 1998, Serbia’s opposition again attempted to establish a durable coali-
tion. The Alliance for Change joined four parties, among them the DS.34 Both
the DSS and the SPO refused to join the alliance and as a result, it soon faltered.
By 2000, however, the mood of the opposition had changed. In January, 18 polit-
ical parties called upon Milošević to hold new elections.35 Thus began the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia ( DOS ), the coalition which facilitated Miloše -
vić’s downfall. 
For the first months of its existence, DOS exhibited many of the flaws that
proved fatal to its predecessors : it was fragile, prone to rivalry, and offered little
substantive alternative to Milošević’s socialist agenda. What distinguished DOS
from its forerunners was its ability to overcome such problems. To understand
how this was possible, it is necessary to clarify the challenges confronting coali-
tion formation as experienced by DOS and its predecessors. 
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V. Unsuccessful attempts to form a coalition from 1990–2000 : 
what went wrong ?
Of the nine coalitions that Serbia’s opposition attempted in the 1990s, eight
proved unable to withstand the numerous compromises demanded of political
unity. As a result, the majority of such alliances either excluded significant mem-
bers of the Serbian opposition or were so fractured that they collapsed at the
first sign of setback. As shall be demonstrated, many of the challenges con-
fronting the pro - democratic opposition in Serbia appear to have had similarly
deleterious effects on coalition formation in other instances of competitive
authoritarian rule. Amongst the problems inhibiting effective coalition forma-
tion in Serbia from 1990 to 2000 were the following : 
Policy : As was the case in Slovakia, Croatia, Ukraine and Georgia, opposing
views on key political issues helped terminate at least half of Serbia’s coalition
attempts. Policy differences encouraged members of AOS to run on separate
tickets for Serbia’s first parliamentary elections and they also shaped the ulti-
mate demise of the USDO, DEPOS, and Zajedno. Of particular importance
were differing positions on the so - called ‘national question’, the constitutional
order, and the role of the Orthodox Church. While the extent of such differences
was often exaggerated, they served to legitimize disunity.36 A similar pattern can
be witnessed in Russia today, where oppositional parties go to lengths to distin-
guish their own political agendas from that of their oppositional counterparts,
rather than stressing their united opposition to the Putin regime.37
Tactics : A second bone of contention in Serbia was that of political strategy.
Of particular concern was the matter of electoral participation, with some par-
ties opposed and other in favor of electoral boycotts. In the case of DEPOS, the
DSS supported a boycott of republican elections on the grounds that the rules of
engagement were neither sufficiently free nor fair to justify participation.38
Arguments over the same elections proved similarly detrimental during negotia-
tions to form DEKO. A second source of conflict was that of parties’ relationship
to the regime. While some favored a strategy of total opposition to Milošević,
others believed it was possible to reform the regime from within. One of the pri-
mary reasons DS refused to join DEPOS, for example, was its leaders’ belief that
existing institutions provided adequate means through which to bring about
change. Vojislav Koštunica disagreed, arguing that compromise “could not apply
in Serbia where the institutions were fashioned in order to preserve the domi-
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nant position of the ruling socialists.”39 Similar concerns caused discord again in
1994, when some DEPOS II members abruptly jumped ship to form a coalition
government with Milošević’s SPS. 
The problem of cooptation is not confined to the Serbian opposition; in com-
petitive and other semi - authoritarian contexts – particularly those in Central
Asia – regimes often coax oppositional parties, or particular factions thereof,
into power - sharing arrangements. A prime example hereof is the Rakhmonov
regime, which employed precisely such tactics against its competitor, the Demo -
cratic Party of Tajikistan. By recognizing only one wing of the party, Rakhmonov
set forth a wave of interparty discord that is evident to this day.40
Ego and Rivalry : The most significant factors inhibiting the formation of effec-
tive coalitions in Serbia were those of ego and rivalry. Oppositional parties often
regarded their colleagues more as competitors than as potential partners in the
struggle against Milošević. Much of this had to do with ego : Each leader longed
to lay claim to the coveted role of ‘king of the opposition’.41 Inflated egos were
exacerbated by the fact that no single oppositional party was the clear electoral
favorite. Had one party boasted a significant majority of the anti - Milošević vote,
clear lines of authority may have emerged, thereby enabling the dominant party
to set the tone of the alliance. This was not the case however. Apart from a brief
period in the early 1990s, there was no clear leader of the pack. While the SPO
was certainly a frontrunner, its leader Vuk Drašković, was divisive and offered
little appeal to Serbia’s rural masses.42 The DS was Serbia’s second largest pro -
democratic oppositional party, but it too had little hope of achieving national sta-
tus. As a result, each party sought to secure its own preeminence. Rivalry was
not unique to the Serbian case. In Belarus, for example, tension between
Milinkevich and Kazulin was reminiscent of that between Drašković and Đinđić
of the DS, with each putting personal ambition ahead of national interest.43 Ego
played no less a debilitating role in Georgia or Ukraine, and has had a markedly
negative impact on oppositional unity in Russia, where public bickering between
pro - democratic parties has become commonplace.
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41 At no point was this more evident than in Vuk Drašković’s betrayal of the Zajedno
alliance. In explaining his decision to stand elections alone, the SPO leader remarked
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42 Until mid - 1991, SPO was widely regarded as the symbol of Serbia’s opposition. After
Vuk Draskovič’s arrest in March of that year, however, the DS became a political force
in its own right.
43 See for example : Vitali Silitski, Belarus Learning from Defeat. In : Journal of Demo -
cracy, 16 (2006) 4, p. 138–152.
VI. Successful Attempts to form a Coalition : List of Contributors
At the outset, DOS suffered from many of the problems described above. Policy
differences between the DSS and several of Serbia’s minority parties seemed set
to destroy the coalition. The lack of a clear DOS platform hinted at parties’
inability to unite.44 As in previous years, DOS members belabored the question
of participation, unable to agree on a boycott, let alone a joint presidential candi-
date to run in their name. When in June 2000 Drašković refused to sign a char-
ter committing SPO to contesting federal elections, many predicted the coali-
tion’s collapse. Paradoxically, it was not until SPO parted paths with DOS that
the latter united. Only then did DOS put forward a joint platform offering voters
a clear alternative to the status quo.45 By the time Milošević called for presiden-
tial elections to be scheduled for September 2000, the alliance was united
behind a single presidential candidate : Vojislav Koštunica of the DSS. What
enabled DOS’s successful transformation from problem - riddled alliance to effec-
tive coalition ? In contrasting the DOS coalition to its predecessors, one sees that
seven factors were of vital importance, among them : 
Increased Urgency : Following the NATO bombing of Serbia in the spring of
1999, the regime’s use of oppression became more pronounced.46 In March
2000, the independent daily Večernje Novosti was placed under state control,
and various local radio stations were closed on the basis of irregularities. By
May, larger media outlets – including Radio B92, Studio B, and Blic – were shut
down or taken over by the regime. Serbian activists regularly faced arrest and
physical violence for the mere expression of political dissent. During the summer
of 2000, police arrested over 1,000 members of the youth movement, Otpor.
Also in 2000, a series of assassination attempts littered the political landscape.
In June, an attempt on Drašković’s life had effectively forced him into political
exile. And in August, Ivan Stambolić – a critic of the regime –mysteriously disap-
peared.47 Of additional concern during this period was the proposed Law on
Terrorism. Though ostensibly a tool in the fight against Kosovar separatism, the
Law’s passing would have effectively banned all forms of political opposition to
the regime. Although the proposal was ultimately withdrawn, it was indicative of
the growing lengths to which the regime would go to suppress political competi-
tion.48 By late 2000 Milošević seemed poised to cross the line into fully - fledged
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authoritarian rule. In the words of one DOS member, the regime was engaged
“in a transition from concealed to open dictatorship.”49
Perception of Critical Moment : Milošević’s decision to call for elections in
September 2000 provided Serbia’s opposition with the opportunity to facilitate
regime change. Were DOS to prove victorious, Milošević would be forced from
power. Were he to win, however, Milošević would very likely eliminate all rem-
nants of political pluralism in Serbia. Impending elections served to galvanize
the opposition, providing a clear end - goal. The often - cited slogan Sad ili Nikad
(Now or Never ), which civil society organizations used to mobilize the masses
on Election Day, was testament to the opposition’s conviction that this was
indeed a critical moment. 
Public Support for Unity : The Milošević regime boasted a high level of public
support for only the first half of its rule. By the late 1990s support for the SPS
had declined dramatically. In the fall of 1999, for example, public opinion polls
showed that over 70 percent of the population favored political change of some
sort.50 But while voters were unhappy with Milošević, they were equally dissatis-
fied with the choices on offer amongst Serbia’s opposition. As a result, support
for the SPS continued to exceed support for any other party in Serbia well into
the second half of the 1990s. Thanks in part to assistance provided by the United
States, Serbian oppositional parties were well aware of this fact. They were also
aware of the one major exception to this rule : polling data showed that if given
the choice, Serbs would rather vote for a single oppositional candidate than for
Milošević himself.51 Were the opposition to unite in the run - up to presidential
elections, Milošević could face defeat. This knowledge provided great incentive
for Serbia’s opposition to unite. For those who were unconvinced by such polls
– namely, Vuk Drašković – the case for unity was unpersuasive. 
Civil Society : The fourth factor strengthening the DOS alliance was that of
increasing pressure from civil society. For much of the 1990s relations between
civil society organizations and oppositional political parties were marred by ten-
sion and mutual suspicion.52 In the aftermath of the NATO bombing, however,
animosity gave way to a sense of shared purpose : that of defeating Milošević.
Civil society organizations worked, on the one hand, to support DOS efforts to
overthrow Milošević, and on the other, to pressure the coalition to maintain its
unity in the face of adversity. Organizations like Otpor were particularly adept in
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51 In October of 1999, 20 opposition leaders participated in a seminar held at the Mar -
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ing data commissioned by the American consultancy firm, Penn, Schoen and Berland
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this regard. In mid - 2000, Otpor introduced the slogan, ko izda pizda ( very
roughly translated into English as “who betrays, pays” ).53 The phrase was brand -
ed in everything from televised commercials to leaflets and posters. It was also
promoted by Otpor members during DOS events in an attempt to pressure DOS
members to maintain unity. Similar, if less brazen, initiatives were launched by
other organizations in the months leading up the presidential elections of
September 2000. Yet, civil society did more than merely pressurize the opposi-
tion. It also actively supported the coalition’s efforts to defeat the regime. A
prime example of this was the Serbian think tank G17, which spearheaded a pro-
grammatic platform upon which all DOS members could agree. 
International Community : Together, European and American donors spent
approximately $ 80 million during the 18 month period leading up to Milošević’s
ouster.54 Some, though not all, of that amount was targeted at efforts to unite the
opposition. Both the American party institutes –National Democratic Institute
(NDI ) and International Republican Institute – and the German party founda-
tions ( for example Konrad - Adenauer - Stiftung, Friedrich - Ebert - Stiftung ), imple-
mented projects with the aim of bringing the Serbian opposition under one roof.
According to Goran Svilanović, former president of the GSS, “the foreign initia-
tive was decisive”.55 Public opinion polls funded by the United States proved to
be an excellent resource. During an NDI seminar held in March 1999, for
example, Ameri can pollsters urged the opposition to unite on the basis evidence
drawn from public opinion data. American consultants appealed to the leaders
of Serbia’s democratic opposition to forgo internal strife and concentrate instead
on the goal before them.56 Foreign support was also dedicated to civil society
organizations, including Otpor and the G17 ( siehe oben ), in support of their
efforts to unite the opposition. Grants from the National Endowment for
Democracy, the Center for International Private Enterprise, and the Open Society
Institute provided the funds through which such activities could be realized.57
Diplomacy was another tool used to keep the opposition united. Considerable
diplomatic leverage was applied on DOS leaders, including Zoran Đinđić,
Goran Svilano vić, and to a lesser extent, Vojislav Koštunica. DOS members met
regularly with Western diplomats and authorities, the vast majority of which
preached the desirability of unity.58
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Clear Hierarchy : Altered internal relations between its members also played a
role in DOS’s transformation. When on August 6, 2000 Drašković announced
his intention to contest federal Presidential elections independently, DOS’s ruin
seemed all but certain. However, Drašković’s departure had the opposite effect :
24 hours after his exit, DOS parties put forward a single Presidential candidate
to act in their name : Vojislav Koštunica. Without the SPO, a clear hierarchy
emerged within DOS ranks, based primarily of Koštunica’s perceived popularity
and the DS’s – which was the largest party in DOS – pragmatic organizational
skills. Without SPO’s excessive demands, DOS coalition members were better
able to construct power - sharing arrangements. Indeed, previous divisions
amongst DOS members owed much to Drašković’s ( mistaken ) conviction that
he alone was the rightful leader of the opposition. As a result of his own political
miscalculations59, Drašković demanded control of DOS’s decision - making that
far exceeding his party’s actual strength. Unfortunately for Drašković, by the
time DOS formed in early 2000, his party’s support had declined considerably,
owing to its federal alliance with the Milošević regime. Thus, by 1999 the SPO
was perceived as having “abandoned opposition politics”60 and being little more
than “a Trojan horse for the regime within opposition ranks.”61 As a result of the
SPO’s declining status, DOS members were unwilling to accept Drašković’s con-
ditions. Few, for example, were convinced by Drašković’s call for an electoral
boycott. Fewer still believed Drašković to have large enough appeal to warrant
his nomination as DOS presidential candidate. With neither DOS nor Drašković
willing to submit to the other’s demands, there was little prospect for fruitful
cooperation. Once Drašković left DOS, however, the door to negotiation was
opened. It was not long before a power - sharing arrangement was struck between
DOS members, the most important of which was an agreement between Vojislav
Koštunica and Zoran Đinđić. Owing to the former’s popular appeal, Koštunica
was awarded the position of DOS presidential nominee. In return, Zoran Đinđić
of the DS would lead the future DOS parliamentary faction, thereby cementing
Đinđić’s role as prime minister should Koštunica defeat Milošević in September
2000. 
Hindsight : By 2000, Serbia’s opposition had been struggling against the
Milošević regime for over a decade. It had become clear that when and where
the opposition was divided, the regime was victorious. By contrast, electoral rev-
olutions in neighboring countries demonstrated that a coalition of oppositional
parties could facilitate regime change. In Croatia in 1999 and Slovakia in 1998,
ideologically divergent political parties had formed joint platforms in opposition
to the ruling party. Such examples provided a model which the Serbian opposi-
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tion might replicate.62 Serbian politicians learned not only from the example set
by others but also from their own experiences. The failure of the Alliance for
Change to challenge Milošević’s power convinced its leaders that a more inclu-
sive coalition was a requisite for political transformation. Similarly, Drašković’s
failure to force Milošević to call for new elections in 1999 was equally indicative
of a divided opposition’s impotence. By 2000, Goran Svilanović of DOS admit-
ted that “our unity is produced by these two failures.”63 This contrasts noticeably
with statements made in the summer of 1999, when political parties claimed not
to “have time to unite all the opposition.”64 Lessons learned through failure in
practice helped ensure that Serbia’s opposition would not make the same mis-
takes thrice. 
Each of the aforementioned factors enabled DOS’s transformation from
rocky alliance to effective coalition. It was in fact the combination of such factors
that helped bolster the alliance, with each contributing to and / or reinforcing the
other. Thus, were it not for strong public support in favor of oppositional unity,
it is unlikely that the efforts of civil society organizations would have been met
with success. Likewise, without the growing sense of urgency confronting the
opposition in 2000, it is doubtful that elections would have been perceived as a
critical moment. Had the opposition not benefited from ten years of activism,
even the most telling of polling data may not have convinced Serb leaders to
forego personal ambition. It was thus the interplay of these seven factors that
proved decisive. Had any single factor not been present on the eve of electoral
revolution, DOS may very well have proved to be no more successful than its
eight predecessors. 
VII. Conclusion
By the mid - 1990s, a marked sense of skepticism pervaded scholars’ predictions
regarding democracy’s future expansion throughout the post - communist
world.65 The electoral revolutions which swept through southeastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union seemed to repudiate such skepticism, however
briefly, and have therefore come under increasing scrutiny. Given that opposi-
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tional unity is now widely regarded as a key facilitator of electoral revolution,66
this article has sought to offer tentative propositions regarding the factors and
actors which contribute to pro - democratic coalition formation in competitive
authoritarian contexts. It has done so on the basis of a comparative case study
examining successful and unsuccessful attempts to form a pro - democratic coali-
tion in Milošević’s Serbia. As the Serbian opposition’s unsuccessful attempts to
form a coalition demonstrate, differences regarding policy and tactics, as well as
interparty rivalry were major impediments to the formation of unified coalitions.
To overcome these hurdles, the interplay of seven factors were crucial : 1) an
increased sense of urgency; 2) the perception of a critical moment; 3) public sup-
port for unity; 4) pressure and support from civil society; 5) support from the
international community; 6) a clear internal hierarchy, and finally; 7) past expe-
rience. Had any of these factors been absent, the DOS coalition may have disin-
tegrated long before a serious challenge to Milošević’s reign was launched. But
just how telling are such findings for the larger post - communist area ? To what
extent can we draw parallels beyond Serbia ? Having established their impor-
tance for the Serbian case, the general relevance of such factors takes on new sig-
nificance. 
Clearly, further research on individual cases is needed before we can speak of
general preconditions for coalition formation in competitive authoritarian con-
texts. The case investigated here has provided an initial basis against which to
compare future findings. There is, however, reason to suspect that some of the
factors which enabled coalition formation in Serbia may have played a role in
coalition formation elsewhere. In Slovakia, for example, the government’s deci-
sion to override a national referendum on presidential elections and Slovakia’s
NATO accession “shook public opinion and the opposition into action”,67 just as
Milošević’s increasing encroachment of Serbs’ political and civil liberties did in
Serbia. As in Serbia, there is evidence that Slovak, Croatian, and Ukrainian elec-
tions provided the critical moment through which to justify unity. Only after elec-
tions were called in these cases, did oppositional unity begin in earnest. Public
opinion in favor of oppositional unity may have been similarly encouraging in
other instances of electoral revolution, particularly where the American party
institutes invested heavily in polling data.68
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Yet other factors may have played a more predominant role in the Serbian
case than elsewhere. One example of this is the role played by civil society. In
Slovakia, Croatia, Georgia, and Ukraine, nongovernmental organizations pro-
vided invaluable support to the opposition, but they often played a less critical
role in pressing the opposition to unite. In Croatia relations between civil society
and political parties remained distant.69 In Ukraine, while civil society organiza-
tions such as Pora helped mobilize the electorate, they were less active than their
Serb counterparts in shaming the opposition into unity.70 Unfortunately, such
propositions remain tentative and thus more research must be conducted before
parallels to the Serbian case can be verified. For these to be confirmed, scholars
must continue their investigations into the origins of coalition formation in other
cases of electoral revolution.
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